

Executive Registry  
79-5330

Washington, D.C. 20505

20 November 1979


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
NSC ADVISOR

Attached is a think piece on Iranian reaction to the possibility of the Shah's leaving the United States for a destination other than Iran.

/s/ Stansfield Turner  
STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

"If The Shah Leaves The US"



Prepared at EOB/Jackie  
Distribution:

Orig - Handed to Addressees by DCI at SCC mtg., 20 Nov 79  
1 - O/DCI  
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NSA review(s) completed.

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19 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: IF THE SHAH LEAVES THE US

1. The following is a preliminary evaluation of the reaction in Tehran if the Shah decides to leave the US in the near future.

2. We believe that the Iranians are likely to attempt to increase pressure on the US whether the Shah leaves or stays. But his departure is likely to lead to immediate, adverse consequences for the hostages--and possibly other Americans in Tehran. So long as the Shah stays, the possibility will remain that the Iranians might be willing to release some additional hostages in hopes of gaining their ultimate goal, the extradition of the Shah, or some other significant concessions from the US. Moreover, the continued presence of the Shah might leave the door open for some future negotiations to secure the release of all the hostages or at least their transfer to Iranian government control.

3. The Shah's departure would introduce a new and dangerous uncertainty into the situation, fueling Iranian paranoia and anger over what they would regard as a US attempt to circumvent their expected victory. Moreover, an important issue in the current crisis is the Iranians' fear that somehow the US is seeking to undermine their revolution; they could very well interpret his departure from the US as the first step in a new US-backed plot to overturn the Iranian revolution. If a third country agrees to receive the Shah, the Iranians would assume that country was acting at the US' behest and was subject to US influence.

4. In the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the US Embassy both the "students" and the Khomeini regime might have interpreted the Shah's departure from the US as an act of good faith on our part. Now, his departure to a third country would increase their frustration and probably lead to an early decision to try some or all of the remaining

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hostages. The "students" have already said that if the Shah leaves the US, they will put some of the hostages on trial for spying. Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council--even if they wanted to prevent the trials--seem to be powerless to stop them.

5. If the hostages are subject to trial for espionage, our concern must turn to the possible sentences that will be imposed on them. While there is an outside chance that some of the hostages will be found innocent or guilty of only minor offenses, we believe that those put on trial would already have been designated as "guilty of serious crimes against the Iranian people." We do not know what penalty is imposed by "Islamic Justice" for spying. Moreover, we have no reporting that addresses the circumstances under which any trials would be held or likely sentences.

6. We believe, however, that the following break-down covers the most likely possibilities.

A. The Khomeini regime orders the hostages removed from the Embassy compound for trial elsewhere under official auspices:

--"students" agree.

--"students" refuse and a stand-off occurs.

--"students" refuse and the regime uses force to gain its way. The hostages may be caught in cross-fire or shot by the "student" captors.

--"students" refuse and open trials under their control. (See II)

B. "Student" controlled trials held on Embassy Compound:

--they try publicly to humiliate in some fashion after lengthy media exploitation, and

a. sentence the hostages, but release them to the government for expulsion. A possible face-saving arrangement, but it assumes that the regime can control the captors and that publicity and any gestures the US is willing to make will be satisfactory.

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- b. sentence and present the regime with a fait accompli requiring it to implement the sentences or take responsibility for a less revolutionary attitude. Also a face-saver--primarily for the "students"--with the same assumptions.
  - c. sentence and announce that those found guilty will be imprisoned by the "students" on the Compound for the length of their sentences or until the Shah is returned.
  - d. sentence and execute some or all of the hostages before any outside force (regime or US) could intervene.
- C. Results of trial under Khomeini regime auspices:
- trial, lengthy media exploitation, public humiliation of hostages and
    - a. expulsion. Again assumes that publicity and US gestures will be enough.
    - b. sentence to physical punishment/imprisonment/execution but delay while giving the US a final chance to return the Shah.
    - c. sentence to physical punishment/imprisonment/execution and implement some or all sentences without allowing the US a final opportunity to bend.
- D. Possible venue of government imprisonment:
- internment on Embassy compound with
    - a. "students" allowed to maintain control.
    - b. other forces providing guards.
  - internment in another private location, perhaps outside of Tehran (i.e., Qom)
  - incarceration in special area of an Iranian prison or jail.

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
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--imprisonment among other political prisoners,  
leaving US personnel fully vulnerable to the  
privations and harassment inflicted on Iranian  
detainees.

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Washington, D. C. 20505

20 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a study on Iran's vulnerability to a reduction of imports. The report is 10 pages; the attached details are more than you want, but may be handy for reference on ports, rail and road networks, etc.

/s/ Stansfield Turner  
STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

[redacted] "Iranian-US Economic Sanctions:  
Impact and Reactions"

[redacted]

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25X1

The Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Executive Registry

79-5332

Washington, D.C. 20505

20 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHAIRMAN, JCS  
NSC ADVISOR

Attached are our latest evaluations of the readiness  
of each of the Iranian armed services.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

25X1 [redacted] "Status of Iranian Ground Forces"  
[redacted] "Status of Iranian Fighter Aircraft and Air  
[redacted] "Status of Iranian Navy" Defense Systems"

19 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Ground Forces

25X1 [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Ground force capabilities remain limited despite some improvement in discipline and operational readiness in recent months. [REDACTED]  
25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED]  
The military would be hard pressed to defend against a full-scale Iraqi or Soviet attack. In the northwest, the Army's position would deteriorate quickly should the Kurds press their attacks. The ground forces appear capable of suppressing Arab opposition in the southwest oil fields as long as Iraq does not increase its aid to the dissidents.

Ground Forces

25X1 [REDACTED]  
The regular Army numbers about 150,000 men, down from approximately 300,000 prior to the revolution. The bulk of the Army's combat strength is garrisoned along Iran's border with Iraq and the Soviet Union (see Attachment). Many artillery and support units are near the larger towns in the interior. Except for numerous small units dispatched to fight the Kurds, no major ground force redeployments or exercises have occurred since the revolution. [REDACTED]

25X1 *This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research for the Iran Task Force. Questions or comments may be addressed to Chief, Iran Task Force on [REDACTED]* 25

25X1 [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] TOP SECRET [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



Central Intelligence Agency  
National Foreign Assessment Center  
16 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Fighter Aircraft and Air  
Defense Systems

The Iranian Air Force has remained intact since the fall of the Shah, but its ability to operate effectively has been severely impaired. Maintenance and supply problems have reduced the number of serviceable aircraft and curtailed pilot training. Although flying squadrons have remained fully manned and pilots report for duty, their proficiency has been reduced because they have been logging only some two to five hours of flying per month.

Although some aircraft were used against the Kurds, most aircraft have been flown only enough to perform maintenance checks and keep pilots minimally qualified. Iran's F-14 fighters would be less of a threat to hostile aircraft than its F-4 and F-5 aircraft, which are more numerous, in better condition, and more familiar to Air Force personnel. Most of Iran's surface-to-air missile systems (SAMS) probably are not operational, and its air defense radar network has serious problems or gaps in coverage that would make detection of incoming aircraft difficult at best.

*This memorandum was prepared for the Iran Task Force. Comments and queries may be addressed to* [redacted] extension [redacted]

SR M 79-10165J

Copy No. 3

TOP SECRET

17 November 1979--

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Navy

25X1 The operational capability of Iran's Navy\* has declined steadily during 1979 because of poor maintenance and a lack of military discipline. The Iranians appear incapable of maintaining the ships on their own and our reports indicate that a general shortage of parts has adversely affected the operational readiness of the ships. In addition, political interference, and the attendant confusion in lines of authority at the local bases, has hampered the Navy's effectiveness. [redacted]

25X1 The Navy has held two exercises since the summer, but they were not large scale. In September, the exercise was a meager show, with fewer than 10 ships--mostly patrol craft--participating. A commando landing also was scheduled but we cannot confirm that it actually took place. Of the seven major combatants, only two frigates participated. We believe that the schedule called for more ships to participate, but that some were unable to put to sea. [redacted]

25X1 This past week, the Navy held another exercise [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]  
near the Strait of Hormuz. We can confirm naval activity in that area [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]  
[redacted]

*\*An attachment is a map showing the Iranian Naval Bases and our estimate of the ships based there.*

25X1 This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research for the Iran Task Force. Questions or comments may be addressed to Chief, Iran Task Force on [redacted]

25X1A